B |     (ECNS)-- China's newly implemented Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law has elicited a predictable response from certain Western media outlets. Whenever ethnic unity is referenced, some Western critics rush to frame it as "assimilation" or a push for uniform national identity.    Fan Yichou, associate professor at the Law School of Minzu University of China, argues that such misinterpretations arise primarily from projecting Western historical nation-state building trajectories onto China's ethnic policies.    Put simply, some Western observers do not view China from the perspective of its domestic social realities, but rather judge it through the lens of their own historical experience.    Fan argued that the traditional Western nation-state model rests on a core premise: one ethnic community ought to align with one sovereign state, with political boundaries largely overlapping ethnic territories. To build culturally homogeneous nation-states, most Western powers historically sought to eradicate internal ethnic diversity through assimilation, exclusion, and other coercive measures. Such nation-building drives were often accompanied by territorial conquest, mass population displacement, and systemic violence.    He drew on arguments laid out by Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka, who observes that the classical European template of nation-building rested on an implicit consensus: states should strive to become culturally homogeneous, by either assimilating national minorities or expelling them. For centuries, this ideal of a mono-national state shaped state policy across almost all Western European countries, with Switzerland stands out as the only major exception.    This deep-rooted historical trajectory continues to frame contemporary discourse on ethnic governance.    A stark modern illustration emerged in 2025, when Danish local authorities took away the newly-born daughter of an 18-year-old Inuit mother from Greenland just one hour after birth following a controversial parenting competency assessment. Her case was far from isolated. According to reports by the BBC and other media outlets, another Greenlandic mother had all three of her children under state custody. She was first subjected to a so-called parenting competency test after social services raised concerns about the language development of her eldest daughter. Although the Danish government has decided to stop using such tests on Greenlandic families, local authorities have yet to halt the practice.    The enduring harm of assimilationist policies extends far beyond this Danish case. UNESCO’s Memory of the World archives document that Canada's Indigenous residential school system continuously operated for nearly 150 years, with the explicit state objective of assimilating Indigenous children into settler society. Generations of Indigenous children were forcibly separated from their families, severed from their ancestral languages, cultural traditions, and intergenerational knowledge systems.        The United States has grappled with comparable challenges. According to a 2025 Associated Press report, Native American children in California are roughly about four times more likely to enter the foster-care system than their peers.    Newborns separated from their mother shortly after birth. Generations of children torn apart from their families and ancestral languages. Indigenous youth who remain vastly overrepresented in foster-care placements to this day. All these are legacies of the West's long-standing obsession with assimilation.    That explains why, when some in the West hear China speak of "ethnic unity," they instinctively equate it with "assimilation." In reality, they are projecting their own social trauma onto China.    China's context, however, is fundamentally different.    As Fan Yichou notes, China has long been a unified multi-ethnic country. Within the Chinese tradition, political unity has not demanded cultural uniformity. Instead, unity and diversity have coexisted across most of the nation's history.    This outlook finds theoretical expression in the concept of plurality-in-unity put forward by renowned Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaotong. In his framework, China's 56 ethnic groups represent the plurality, whereas the Chinese nation embodies unity.    From this perspective, the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law is not designed to eliminate ethnic differences. Instead, it seeks to strengthen a shared sense of belonging while respecting cultural diversity.    This distinction highlights a broader divergence between China and the West in approaching identity and social cohesion.    In many Western societies, historical assimilation sought to diminish group differences and compel minority groups to conform to dominant-culture norms. By contrast, China's emphasis on forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation is not intended to obliterate diversity. It seeks to build shared civic and national identity, while enabling all ethnic groups to sustain their own languages, customs, and cultural traditions.        Ethnic groups may speak different languages, practice different customs, and vary in development level. Yet they can still uphold shared dedication to national progress and a common sense of belonging within a unified multi-ethnic state.    Genuine ethnic unity does not require everyone to fit into the same mold. It means ensuring that different ethnic groups can participate in national development while maintaining their own cultural characteristics and thriving with equal dignity and equitable opportunities.    So when some in the West equate China's "ethnic unity" with "assimilation," their judgment stems not from an accurate assessment of China’s reality, but from a subconscious projection of their own historical burdens, contemporary social anxieties, and deep-rooted institutional scars onto China's ethnic policies.    They are either unwilling or unable to fully comprehend China's governance philosophy and practices, yet arbitrarily pass arrogant judgment on the country. The outcome of this biased approach will be no exception of absurd narratives that fundamentally contradict objective reality.                    。跑友们发出灵魂拷问：永久号，不中签，到底有毛用？

永久号不该是“空头支票”永久号设立的初衷，肯定是好的！无论是某个赛事连跑几年，获得永久号，本质上都是为了致敬那些忠实跑者。他们连续多年跑这个赛事，是赛事的活名片，是赛道上的精神标杆，理应得到一份特别的礼遇。但问题是，有些赛事把永久号玩成了“空头支票”——给你一个号码，然后就没有然后了。

C | 报名照样要抽签，中签照样看运气。这跟发一张“荣誉会员卡”却不给任何会员权益有什么区别？跑友要的不是一个虚名，而是一份实实在在的尊重。永久号该怎么玩？永久号就要像某些赛事一样，拿出满满的诚意。

D | 厦门马拉松：完赛10场即可获取永久号，每届预留赛事规模10%的免费直通名额给永久号选手，这就是诚意。安阳马拉松：连续三年完赛即可申领，永久号选手报名全程或半程项目，无需抽签，直接获得参赛资格。而且号码还可以自选，“2222”“8888”这种靓号先到先得，跑友玩得不亦乐乎。兰州马拉松：累计8届全马完赛可获终身号，同样直通参赛。这些赛事的共同点是：门槛清晰，权益明确，说到做到。永久号的核心价值不在于那个号码有多好看，而在于它的权益有多大！别让永久号，变成笑话永久号本来是好事，但有些赛事不急于任何特权，硬生生地把好事玩成了“笑话”！但也有人说：“永久号选手直通，那不是挤占了普通跑友的中签率吗？”这话听着有理，实则站不住脚。一个赛事几万个名额，永久号选手能有几个？厦门马拉松永久号名额占总规模的10%，对整体中签率的影响不大。

E | 真正的公平，不是让所有人都一样，而是让付出更多的人得到应有的回报。

F | 如果一个忠诚的跑友连续跑某个赛事七八届，花了上万块钱报名费、交通费、住宿费，年复一年地支持赛事，申请一个永久号，给点直通的特权也不为过。永久号应该是“双向奔赴”说到底，永久号不是施舍，更不是噱头。它应该是跑者和赛事之间的一种契约：你用坚持和热爱换取一份确定性，我用直通和礼遇回馈你的忠诚。跑友们想要的很简单。门槛要说清楚，别今天三年明天五年，朝令夕改；权益要落实，直通就是直通，别整“优先抽签”这种文字游戏；号码要珍惜，别动不动就收回。永久号的意义，不在于那个号码本身，而在于它代表的某种意义。当你带着永久号跑完赛事后，至少你知道明年你还回来，还能来，这种归属感，是花钱买不来的。